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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JACK LAYTON and MARIAN LAYTON, a partnership dba DENVER
AUTO AUCTION,
Respondents,
No. 8238
vs.
KAY CLARK,
Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE
CLARENCE E. BAKER, JUDGE

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action in replevin brought by the plaintiffs,
doing business as the Denver Auto Auction, against one, Kay
Clark, in which it is alleged by the Complaint on file that the
3
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plaintiffs are the owners and entitled to the possession of one,
1950 Buick Special, 4 door Sedan, Motor No. 55806184. The
facts have been stipulated to and are on file in said case. Said
facts are briefly as follows: That the plaintiffs are in the
business known as the Denver Auto Auction with their place
of business in Denver, Colorado. That they are in the business
of selling automobiles wholesale by auction to automobile
dealers. That one, M. R. Bruce, a licensed automobile dealer,
doing business as RaDon Auto Sales at Salt Lake City, Utah,
on or about the 3rd day of March, 195 3, purported to buy
three automobiles from the plaintiffs including the Buick described in the Complaint. That the said Bruce was given possession of said automobiles and on Bruce's instructions, drafts
were drawn payable in three days from the date thereof and
a copy of which has been incorporated in the stipulation,
said drafts being payable through the First National Bank of
Murray, Utah. That the title to said automobiles, including
the Buick, were attached to the drafts and said titles were
to be delivered to said Bruce on his payment of said drafts.
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That on receiving possession of said automobiles, -the'
said Bruce removed them to Salt Lake City and placed them
on his used car lot where the defendant, Kay Clark, appeared
and purchased, in the usual course of trade, the Buick described
in the complaint. That the said M. R. Bruce never did pay
said draft nor obtain the title to said automobile. That at
the time of the sale by Bruce to the defendant, no inquiry was
made by Clark as to the title of said property and no representations were made by Bruce to Clark except those contained in the purchase order, a copy of which is attached to
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the Stipulation of Facts, the certificate of title still being in
the possession of the plaintiffs in this action. It is the contention
of the plaintiffs that the said M. R. Bruce had no right to
sell said automobile, that it was not his property or right
to possession of same as against the plaintiffs, and that the
plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of said Buick automobile.
Based upon these facts and the law, the lower Court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and from said
judgment the defendant appeals to this Court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ESTOPPED TO
ASSERT THEIR TITLE AS AGAINST THE APPELLANT,
AND FOR HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS
NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE AND
THAT HE DID NOT OBTAIN ANY TITLE AS AGAINST
THE RESPONDENTS.

Point II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD
THAT IN COLORADO A RESERVATION OF TITLE IN
A SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IS REGARDED AS
A CHATTEL MORTGAGE, AND IS REQUIRED TO BE
5
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FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE
STATUTE, AND THERE BEING NO COMPLIANCE
WITH THE COLORADO STATUTE ON THIS MATTER
THE RESERVATION OF TITLE IN THE RESPONDENT
IS INVALID.

ARGUMENT
Point I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ESTOPPED TO
ASSERT THEIR TITLE AS AGAINST THE APPELLANT,
AND FOR HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS
NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE AND
THAT HE DID NOT OBTAIN ANY TITLE AS AGAINST
THE RESPONDENTS.
There are no Utah cases directly in point on the question
here involved but the Utah statutes and their interpretation
by the Supreme Court are very helpful in deciding the present
question.
The Court's attention is called to the provisions of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 60, Chapter 2, Section 7,
which reads as follows:
"60- 2-7. Sale by a person not the owner.
( 1) Subject to the provisions of this title, where
goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof,
and who does not sell them under the authority or
with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no
6
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better title to the goods than the seller had, unless
the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded
from denying the seller's authority to sell.

(2) Nothing in this title, however, shall affect:
(a) The provisions of any factors' acts, recording
acts, or any enactment enabling the apparent owner
of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true
owner thereof.
(b) The validity of any contract to sell or sale
under any special common law or statutory power of
sale, or under the order of a court of competent
jurisdiction."
The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 41, Chapter 1,
Section 72, reads as follows:
"41-1-72. Necessary before transfer complete.-Until
the department shall have issued such new certificate of registration and certificate of ownership,
delivery of any vehicle required to be registered shall
be deemed not to have been made and title thereto
shall be deemed not to have passed, and said intended
transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to
be valid or effective for any purpose except as provided
in section 41-1-77 ."
In connection with this case, we call the court's attention to
the case of Swartz vs. White, reported 80 Utah 150, 13 Pac.
( 2) 643, Utah Case 1932. In this case, the plaintiff claimed
to be an innocent purchaser for value and brought an action
for claim and delivery for a Buick roadster automobile against
the defendant. The car was owned by and registered in the
name of the defendant, Mrs. C. H. White. She was also the
legal owner. She advertised the same for sale and a party by
the name of M. J. Stewart appeared at her home and requested
7
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permission to try and sell the car on a commission basis. She
let him take the car to demonstrate but retained the title certificate. He returned the car on two or three occasions. At a
later date, Stewart called on the defendant's husband at his
place of business and told him he had a sale for the car and
asked for the car and also the title certificate. White gave
these to Stewart. Stewart departed with the car and the certificate
of ownership promising to return shortly, which he failed to
do. A new certificate of ownership was issued by the Secretary
of State in the name of M. J. Stewart as owner and Swartz
Sales Service as legal owner. Under the evidence, Stewart
brought the car to the place of business of Swartz and obtained
an advance on the car in the amount of $125.00 and he turned
the title certificate over to Swartz. White saw the automobile
on the street and took possession of the same and Swartz
brought this action claiming that he was the lawful owner
and entitled to the possession of said automobile. The lower
Court held for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court in holding
for the defendant stated on page 645 as follows:

" ( 1, 2) The judgment for plaintiff must be reversed
for the reason, as we view the record, that plaintiff
never at any time obtained title to the car nor was he
shown to be entitled to possession. It is the general rule
"that no one can transfer a better title than he has,
unless some principle of estoppel comes into operation
against the person claiming under what would otherwise be a better title." 24 R.C.L. 374. So also by the
Uniform Sales Act, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section
5132, where goods are sold by a person who is not
the owner, and who does not sell them under the
authority, or with the consent of the owner, the buyer
acquires no better title than the seller had, unless the
8
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owner is by his conduct precluded from denying the
seller's authority to sell. One who acquires property
by theft, or one who by fraud acquires possession of
personal property for a particular purpose with the
intention of appropriating the property to his own
use and without any intention on the part of the owner
to transfer title to him, cannot transfer a good title.
24 R.C.L. 375."
and again on Page 646 as follows:
"The possession of the certificate of ownership indorsed as it was by Mrs. White is not, under our
motor vehicle law, evidence of ownership in Stewart.
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 3972, as amended by
Laws Utah 1925, p. 266, c. 125, Section 3 (now Section 3972XO.) The Statute provides in effect that upon
registration of an automobile the secretary of state
shall issue a certificate of registration and of ownership
to the owner, and upon a transfer being made the owner
shall indorse the certificate of ownership and deliver
it with the certificate of registration to the new owner;
that the certificates shall be delivered to the secretary
of state, who, upon payment of a fee of $1, shall
issue new certificates of registration and ownership
to the person entitled, and that: "Until the Secretary
of State shall have issued such new certificate of registration and certificate of ownership, as herein provided
in sub-division (d) , delivery of such vehicle shall be
deemed not to have been made and title thereto shall
be deemed not to have passed and said intended transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to be valid
or effective for any purpose." The words of the statute,
italicized by us, are clear and unambiguous and undoubtedly mean what they say. Any claimed transfer
from Mrs. White to Stewart was incomplete. Title
had not passed and the transfer was not valid or effective for any purpose. Briedwell v. Henderson, 99
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Or. 506,. 195 P. 575·' Parke v. Franciscus, 194 Cal. 284,
228 P. 435."
In respect to the effect of the registration statutes we call
the Court's attention to the case of Robinson vs. Poole et al.,
Missouri 1950, 232 SW (2) 807, which case held that sale
of a motor vehicle registered in the state without accompanying
Assignment of Title Certificate to buyer is fradulent and void
and imposes an absolute mandatory requirement that sale be
accompanied by such assignment to be valid.
In connection with the White case, a rather recent Idaho
case is called to the Court's attention, Lux vs. Lockridge, 150
Pac. (2) 127, Idaho 1944. In this case, the plaintiff appellant
agreed with the Gray Motor Company to trade an automobile,
pickup truck and three trucks for a new automobile, a new
pickup and three new trucks. Plaintiff to retain possession
until deliveries of the new vehicles. The transaction as to the
new automobile and pickup were completed. Somewhat later
the Gray Motor Company took the defendant to see the
plaintiff's trucks and one of the trucks was taken by an employee of the motor company to the dealer's garage and was
later sold to the defendant. Shortly after this, a freeze on
the sale of new trucks was issued by the United States Government and the motor company was unable to deliver a new
truck to the plaintiff. The plaintiff requested the defendant to
return the truck claiming it had been delivered to the dealer
and defendant upon condition that if the plaintiff was unable
to get a new truck, this truck was to be returned to him. The
defendant refused, claiming that he had no knowledge of an
agreement between the plaintiff and the motor company and
10
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the Court found that the plaintiff did not sell the truck to
the defendant, that he sold it to the Gray Motor Company,
that the defendant, Lockridge, purchased the truck from the
Gray Motor Company and not from the plaintiff and that
Lockridge had no knowledge of any agreement between the
Gray Motor Company and the plaintiff, Lux, and the Court
found that Lockridge was an innocent purchaser of the truck.
Judgment was, nevertheless, entered for the plaintiff, Lux,
to the defendant to deliver the truck to the plaintiff. The
defendant appealed and the judgment was affirmed. The
Court in deciding for the plaintiff discussed the case of Swartz
vs. White as authority for their holding and stated as follows
at Page 128:
" ( 1, 2) There was a sharp conflict in the evidence
as to whether defendant knew plaintiff retained the
right to regain possession of his truck in the event the
company could not deliver a new truck. There is, however, no dispute in the record that the certificate of
title remained at all times in plaintiff's possession and
was never transferred by him to the company or defendant and that defendant received no certificate of
title from the company or plaintiff. All were equally
charged with notice of chapter 144, supra, providing
that no person could "acquire any right, title, claim
or interest in or to" a motor vehicle until the vendee
had issued to him the certificate of title. Without,
therefore, determining whether or not a sale without
the transfer of the certificate is void, though urged
by both parties pro and con to do so, we are impressed
with the cogency of the reasoning in Swartz v. White,
80 Utah 150, 13 P. 2d 643, to the effect that a purchaser not receiving the certificate of title is not a
bona fide purchaser for value and therefore as against
defendant the contract existing between plaintiff and
11
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the company could be shown, defeating his rights to
retain the truck.''
We call the Court's attention to the early annotation
reported in 13 L.R.A. at page 717, which reads as follows:
"A purchaser of chattels takes them, as a general
rule, subject to whatever may turn out to be infirmities
of the title. Farmers & M. Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74
N.Y. 568.
And it is a rule of extended application, that no person can transfer any greater title than he himself has
in the thing transferred. 2 Kent, Com. 324; Saltus v.
Everett, 20 Wend. 267, 275; Brower v. Peabody, 13
N.Y. 121; Peer v. Humphrey, 2 Ad. & El. 495; Dows
v. Perrin, 16 N.Y. 3·25; Covill v. Hill, 4 Denio, 323,
327; Whistler v. Forster, 14 C.B.N.S. 248; Ballard
v. Burgett, 40 N.Y. 314.
The sale of chattels by one not in possession of the
legal title conveys to the transferee no title in the goods,
even where the purchase is for value and in entire
authority. Boyce v. Brockway, 31 N. Y. 490; Brower
v. Peabody, 13 N.Y. 121; Hoffman v. Carow, 22 Wend.
285; Spaulding v. Brewster, 50 Barb. 142; Dudley v.
Hawley, 40 Barb. 397; Cobb v. Dows, 10 N.Y. 335;
Murray v. Burline, 10 Johns. 172; Everritt v. Coffin,
6 Wend. 604; Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 270; Connah
v. Hale, 23 Wend. 462! Covill v. Hill, 4 Denio, 323;
La Place v. Aupoix, 1 Johns, Cas. 407; Disbrow v.
Tenbroeck, 4 E.D. Smith, 397.
F.S.R.,"
and also the law as contained in 46 American Jurisprudence,
Page 620, Section 458, reads as follows:
"458. Generally-It is a general rule as regards personal property that title, like a stream, cannot rise
higher than its source; and therefore, it is a general
12
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principle that a seller without title cannot transfer a
better title than he has, unless some principle of
estoppel comes into operation against the person claiming under what would otherwise be the better title,
as where the owner by some direct and unequivocal
act has clothed the seller with the indicia of ownership,
or unless the seller has authority from the owner. In
other words, the seller of property other than negotiable securities can ordinarily convey no greater rights
than he himself has."
This matter is discussed in Blashfield, Volume 7, Section
4357 as follows:
"The owner of an automobile, it has been held,
merely by reason of having delivered its possession to
a dealer in automobiles, is not estopped to claim title
as against a bona-fide purchaser from the dealer, even
though the dealer was authorized by the owner to
exhibit the automobile for the purpose of obtaining
offers of purchase.
The owner, when trading his automobile to a dealer,
may properly reserve title until the performance of
certain conditions, such as furnishing of the proper
title papers, and hence a sale of the automobile by
the dealer passes no title, since he had none to pass.

***
A person who purchases an automobile from a dealer
without obtaining the title papers, or in reliance on
the dealers promise to furnish the title papers later
without making any effort to ascertain the true ownership, acquires no title as against the owner, where the
owner, for example, had attached the title papers to a
draft and had sold and delivered the automobile to
the dealer subject to payment of the draft, which was
never paid."

13
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The same subject is discussed in Williston on Sales, Section
313, which reads as follows:
"Although intrusting possession to another may
lead an innocent third person to believe the possessor
is the owner, no court has gone so far as to hold that
the mere intrusting with possession would preclude
the owner from asserting his title. If the owner of
goods is responsible for or cognizant of no other
deceptive circumstances, it is an entirely proper thing
for him to intrust another with the goods either for the
advantage of the owner or of the possessor, and the
law has never attempted to debar the owner from so
doing. * * * "
Section 3~14 deals with the possession intrusted to one who
habitually sells such goods. In this section, Williston discusses
the English rule and disagrees with the same. The English
rule apparently holds that title passes to the purchaser, under
such circumstances. Section 315 of Williston reads as follows:
"It is a step beyond the situation considered in the
preceding section if the owner has not only intrusted
possession to one who is in the habit of selling such
goods, but has given him authority to exhibit the goods
to possible purchasers and obtain offers from them.
Even in this case an innocent purchaser is not protected,
but slight additional circumstances may turn the scale."

In Section 316, Williston discusses where possession is intrusted :with indecia of title, and we call to the Court's atten·
tion that Bruce was not given any indecia of title whatsoever
to these automobiles. He had bare possession only. Section
320 of Williston reads as follows:
"A few states and only a few have passed factors
Acts. California, Montana, and North Dakota have
14
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identical provisions originating in the California code.
A Factor has ostensible authority to deal with the property of his principal as his own in transactions with
persons not having notice of the actual ownership."
This last section is importan,t particularly in view of the holding
of California and one or two other cases where they have held
against the plaintiff in an action similar to the one at bar.
California has held that the person in the possession, as
Bruce was in this case, was a factor, and based on that, permitted persons buying the car to retain the same, but Utah
has no such statute and, therefore, the California holding
can clearly be distinguished under Utah law.
The case most nearly in point to the case m question
is Deahl vs. Thomas, Texas Appeals 1949, 224 S. W. (2)
293. In this case the facts are substantially as follows: On or
about October 29, 1948, the appellee sold a new Mercury
Club Coupe to P. C. Hicks, a dealer in used automobiles, for
a consideration of $2950.00, subject to payment of a draft
for $2950.00 in payment of the automobile drawn by Hicks
on a Clarenden bank, payable to appellee. Upon taking possession of the automobile at Clarenden, Hicks sent the draft
to appellee at his home in Lamey, Missouri where it was deposited by appellee, with papers evidencing title to said automobile attached thereto, in a Missouri bank for collection in
due course. On or about October 30, 1948, and before draft
in question had been presented for payment, Hicks sold the
automobile to appellant for a consideration of $2150.00 in
cash, together with a trade-in value of $1125.00 on a used car.
Appellant took possession of new automobile with the understanding Hicks would supply papers in a few days. The
15
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draft was never paid, although presented to Hicks twice. When
appellee learned appellant had possession of the automobile,
he filed suit for recovery. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff
and affirmed. On page 295, the Court held:
"While appellant complains in several points of
error presented of various irregularities of procedure
in the trial court, the controlling issue to be determined
is the question of who holds legal title and the right
of possession of the automobile. Appellant contends
that he is protected under the law of estoppel under
the facts in this case. Yet, under his own admission
as a witness, he purchased the automobile upon the
promise only of Hicks that the necessary papers of
title would be delivered to him later. He inquired about
such papers later and Hicks continued to put him off.
Neither Hicks nor appellant ever received such papers.
There is no evidence even tending to show that appellee concealed or attempted to conceal the title papers
to the automobile, or did anything to prevent their
inspection by anybody. According to appellant's own
testimony, he knew legal title to the automobile was
not delivered to him when he took possession of it
and he made no effort at the time he paid Hicks for
the automobile and took possession of it to determine
the true ownership of the automobile. Appellant could
have ascertained the true ownership of the automobile
at the time he paid for it if he had exercised reasonable
diligence. Under the record before us, it is our opinion
that the law of estoppel does not apply in this case,
Holland vs. Blanchard, Tex. Civ. App. 262 S.W. 97;
Pac. Finance Corp. v. Gilkerson, Tex. Civ. App. 217
s.w. (2) 440.)"
On Page 296 the Court held as follows:
"Section 27 of the certificate of Title Act, Article
1436, Vernons Annotated Penal Code, requires the
16
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procurement of a certificate of Title as a condition
precedent to the right to transfer a motor vehicle.
Section 53 of the same act provides that all sales made
in violation of this act shall be void and no title shall·
pass until the provisions of this act have been complied with. Mere possession of property does not warrant an assumption of legal ownership. The rule is
well established that one who buys property must at
his own peril ascertain the ownership. Seigal v. Warrick, Tex. App. 214 S.W. (2) 883, and other authorities there cited. It has been held that it is the duty of
one who purchases a motor vehicle imported into
. Texas to investigate and see that the seller of the
same has complied with the Texas Certificate Law.
Ball Bros. Trucking Co. vs. Sorenson, Tex. Civ. App.
191 S.W. (2) 908, Appellant did not make such an
investigation in this case or any other investigation
about ownership of the automobile. He relied wholly
on the promise of Hicks to procure the papers later.
He was therefore derelict in performing the duty required of him in order to protect his best interest and
he acted at his own peril in purchasing the automobile
and paying for it merely on the promise of Hicks to
furnish title at some later date."
See also the case of Onwiler vs. Burtrum, decided in 1950,
a Texas case reported in 236 SW (2) 157, and the case of
Fisher vs. Bullington, 50 So. (2) 91, La. 1951. In this case
the plaintiff brought action in replevin to recover a Plymouth
automobile in the possession of the defendant alleging him
to be the owner. One John D. Cole negotiated for the purchase of the automobile and gave a check to the plaintiff
drawn on Twin City Bank of North Little Rock, Arkansas.
The plaintiff attached the title papers to the check and forwarded to the bank for collection. The check returned with
17
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title papers to the plaintiff. The car later was sold by Cole to
one James W. McKenzie, Jr., and by him to the defendant.
Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and on Page 92 the
Court says:
"Plaintiff's action is predicated upon the contention
that his negotiation with Cole was a conditional sale,
as a consequence of which Cole was not vested with
Title nor was the Plaintiff divested of Title to the
vehicle in question until and unless the purchase price
represented by the check delivered to the Plaintiff
by Cole was paid. It logically follows if Plaintiff's
contention be true that the dishonoring of the check
was evidence of the failure of fulfillment of the alleged
conditional sale and that Plaintiff continued to be
vested with ~itle to the automobile despite the machinations of Cole and his associates * * * .
While we have some question as to whether the
transaction between Plaintiff and Cole can be properly
denominated as a conditional sale, we are nonetheless
firmly of the opinion that the precautions taken by
Plaintiff were sufficient to confirm him in the continuance of his Title."
See also Ohio Motors vs. Russell Willis, Inc., a Tennessee case decided in March, 1952, 246 SW (2) 962. The
most recent case in this respect is the case of Slaton vs. Lamb,
Alabama 1954, 71 So. (2) 289. In that case suit was brought
by the seller against an innocent purchaser from the buyer
to recover automobile. The plaintiff through an auto auction
in Tennessee sold to one T. C. McDonald the automobile in
question. He gave a check in payment and a written agreement
was entered into which, among other matters, it was agreed that
title to the automobile should remain with the seller until
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the check had been paid. Buyer was given possession. He took
the automobile to Alabama and sold it on an auction to the
defendant, Slaton, an automobile dealer, who then resold the
car and the car could not be located. The Court held for the
plaintiff and on Page 292 says:
"In the case at bar it is not a question of the purpose
of the sale by Lamb to McDonald. It is a question
of whether ther~ is in fact a sale. As a matter of fact
the sale was never made because the cash was not
paid * * * In the case at bar, Lamb never parted with
the legal Title and never authorized anyone else to
sell so as to pass the title. A purchaser from McDonald,
therefore, could not acquire the legal title which is
necessary to constitute one a bona :fide purchaser."
In the case of Pugh vs. Camp, Ark. 1948, 210 S.W. (2)
120, the appellant traded a Ford to one Haynes, a used car
dealer, for a Chevrolet. The appellant kept title papers on
the Ford until he received title to the Chevrolet. Haynes sold
the Ford. The appellant brought this action in replevin for
the Ford, and the Court said at Page 121:
"If the appellant did reserve the title to the Ford
car, its sale by Haynes passed no title, since he had
none to pass, and title can be reserved by parole."

Crawford Finance Company vs. Derby, 63 Ohio App.
50, 25 N.E. (2) 306. In a case of replevin in a syllabus by the
Court as follows:
"1. The holder of a chattel mortgage on, and a
manufacturers certificate of title to an automobile
given him by a dealer, has a lien on the automobile
superior to any claim of a subsequent buyer of it from
that dealer.
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3•. The Ohio certificate of title law for the registration of title to motor vehicles, Section 6290-2 to
6290-20 general code, is exclusive, and the only way
a buyer can acquire a good title to such a vehicle from
a dealer is by procuring a certificate of title from the
proper clerk of Court as provided in Sections 6290-3,
6290-4 and 6290-5 General Code."
Ji

Payne vs. Strothkamp, Missouri 1941, 153 S.W. (2) 402.
In an action of replevin to recover an automobile from defendant who purchased it from a third party to whom plaintiff
intrusted automobile for demonstration to a prospective buyer,
the Court directed a verdict that plaintiff was entitled to possession of the automobile, held proper under the evidence
that the automobile originally belonged to plaintiff and that
a certificate of title had been issued to him and that plaintiff
had not assigned the certificate as provided by statute.
State Bank of Black Diamond vs. Johnson, 104 Washington 340, 177 Pac. 340. This is a replevin action wherein
the plaintiff seeks recovery of an automobile claiming title
of same by virtue of a conditional sales contract executed
by one Grant-Coffin-Campbell Company, as vendor, an assignment of all the rights of the company under the conditional sales contract and forfeiture of vendee's rights. The
defendants, Johnson and Dahl, claim lawful possession and
title to the automobile as innocent purchasers.
In September of 1917, the company then being the owner
of the automobile and in possession of the same, entered into
a conditional sales contract with A. L. Skonnord. This contract was assigned to the bank assigning all right, title and
20
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interest in and to the note and contract. Skonnord failed to
pay the balance and returned the automobile to the company.
On October 25, 1917, Johnson and Dahl entered into a
conditional sales contract with the cqmpany for the purchase
of a second hand car of the same general description as the
car described in the conditional sales contract above set out but
not specifically describing said car. On the following day,
Campbell delivered the car covered by the conditional sales
contract and gave the bill of sale in the name of "Campbell
Motor Company, Inc." There was no such company and
Johnson and Dahl paid the balance due on their contract. On
December 1, 1917, the bank discovered the sale and then
demand was made on Johnson and Dahl to return the car
to the bank. They refused. Thereafter, this action was brought
and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and affirmed
on appeal. On Page 343, the Court says:
"Johnson and Dahl claimed to be innocent purchasers, also contended the company was engaged in
business of selling automobiles and this automobile
was purchased by Johnson and Dahl at its place of
business, it being in possession and the apparent owner
of the automobile.
It is true that possession of personal property is some
evidence of title thereto by the one in possession of it,
but to sustain Johnson's and Dahl's claim of title in
this case it would be necessary to go to the extent of
invoking in their favor the doctrine that a sale in
market overt vests good title in the vendee though the
vendor had no title, applicable under certain conditions
in England. 35 Cyc. 358. If the vendor has no title,
the vendee acquires none, unless the one having title
has by act or neglect estopped himself from disputing
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the vendees claim of title so acquired. It seems plain
that there was no such estopple here. * * * The fact
still remains that neither, Grant-Coffin-Campbell Company, Campbell.Motor. Compa?y, nor Edward P. Campbell had any nght, htle or 1nterest whatever in the
automobile at the time one or other of them assumed
to sell it to Jo?nson and Dahl. Whatever view may
be taken of th1s case other than the question of the
Bank acquiring title to the automobile by assignment
of the conditional sales contract, there remains the
fact that Johnson and Dahl's vendor had no title to
convey and the want of estopple preventing the Bank
from asserting its title to the automobile."
,

Jiv
I

Judgment affirmed.
Eatonville State Bank vs. Marshall, Wash. 1932. 17 Pac.
( 2) 14. This is an action of replevin by the Eatonville Bank
against Marshall, from Judgment of Dismissal. The plaintiff
appeals and the case was reversed.
The appellant was the owner of a 1929 Ford acquired
from a Ford dealer in satisfaction of a debt. In order to
realize on this car, he turned it over to the Kirkland Motor
Company, a dealer in Fords, giving them permission to exhibit and demonstrate the car to prospective purchasers but
no sale was to be made without appellant's approval. Thereafter, Kirkland Motor Company let one of its salesmen take
the automobile to Seattle on two occasions. When there he
exhibited it to the respondent, a second hand car dealer,
who, on the second visit, purchased the same, paying the
salesman $400.00 and receiving a bill of sale, which the salesman signed as owner and seller. The salesman was never
heard of thereafter and he never made an accounting to the
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Kirkland Motor Company. The respondent relied on the
defense of innocent purchaser. Judgment for the defendant
and was reversed on appeal.
An examination of the annotation cited by the appellant
( 47 A.L.R. 85) shows numerous statements supporting the
position of the respondents in this action. For example, we
quote from the paragraph on Page 88 of the annotation:
"It has been admitted in Pennsylvania in a case involving a bailment lease of motor trucks to a dealer,
that if the bailor permits the bailee so to act with
the property (other than having possession), or so
clothes him with apparent ownership as to mislead
or deceive the public, an estoppel may arise against
the owner, but it is held that such conduct must affirmatively appear from the evidence. Leitch v. Sanford
Motor Truck Co. (1924) 279 Pa. 160, 123 Atl. 658.
And it is held in this case that the fact that the bailee
put the truck on exhibition in the salesroom where
he was engaged in buying and selling the vehicles
would not convert the bailment into a conditional sale,
or estop the owner from asserting his title."
The annotation also refers to an Idaho case, Peasley vs. Noble,
1910, 17 Idaho 686, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 107 Pacific 402. In
light of that case, the Court's attention is called to the case
of Lux vs. Lockridge, supra, showing that in case of a bailment or the delivery of mere possession of a chattel a subsequent purchaser does not acquire a right as against the true
owner of the property.
The appellant relies upon two Utah cases. The first is the
case of Harrison vs. Auto Securities, which is reported in 57
A.L.R. 3-88, followed by an annotation entitled:
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"Right of purchaser from agent or dealer in possession of article for purpose of demonstration or solicitation, without actual authority to sell." (Italics
added.)
The Harrison case is strictly a case of agency. The owner of
the legal title of the property in question entrusted the same
to their agent who in turn sold it to the plaintiff. The Court
on Page 389 says:
"M. L. Graham Company retained title to the automobile until the balance of the purchase price was
paid. The M. L. Graham Company transferred this
contract of sale to the Auto Securities Company and
in the transfer guaranteed the payment of the debt.
In March, 1925, the M. L. Graham Company repossessed the said car and had it in its place of business in Salt Lake City. * * * One G. A. Clark was
a member of the firm of the Clark-Lavan Motor Company. This company was dealing in automobiles at
Price, Utah, and was the agent of the M. L. Graham
Company for the sale of the Gray sedan. It appears
from the record that there was some written contract
existing between the Graham Company and the ClarkLavan Motor Company respecting this agency." (Italics
added.)
Again on Page 390, the Court states:
"It is likewise undisputed that the Clark-Lavan Motor Company maintained a place for the retail of
automobiles at Price, Utah, and also that they were

the agents under some arrangement with the M. L.
Graham Company for the sale of the Gray car at and
prior to the date when this sale was consummated."
(Italics added.)
It is submitted, therefore, that this case is in no way in
point to the case before the Court as there is nothing in the
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Stipulation to indicate any agency extshng between the respondent and the RaDon Auto Sales. The facts as set out in
the Stipulation are to the contrary. It is submitted, therefore,
that the Harrison case does not assist the appellant in this
action. Further, the Court's attention is called to the annotation found in 57 A.L.R. 388, reading on Page 393, as follows:
"It is a principle of both the common and the civil
law, that no one can transfer better title to personal
property than he has, unless some element of estoppel
comes into operation against the person claiming under
what would otherwise be the better title. 24 R.C.L. 373.
The mere possession of chattels by whatever means
acquired, if there is no other evidence of property or
authority to sell from the true owner, will not enable
the possessor to give a good title as against the former.
24 R.C.L. 375. Accordingly, the rule is that mere possession of personal property by an agent or servant
does not confer upon him ostensible authority to sell
it, and a sale under these circumstances does not confer
title as against the principal, even though the buyer
is a bona fide purchaser." (Italics added.)

And pursuing the annotation further, we find cases such as
the case of Royle vs. Worcester Buick Company, 243 Mass.
143, 137 N.E. 531, referred to on Page 394, the facts are somewhat similar to the case at bar, they hold that the true owner
may recover the chattel. Also the Court's attention is called
to the statement at Page 395, which reads as follows:
"In England, and in many jurisdictions in this country, statutes commonly known as the Factors' Act have
been enacted for the protection of persons who in
good faith, and for value, purchase property intrusted
to the possession of a particular class of commercial
agents."
25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

And where such statutes have been enacted, the Courts have
held contrary to the position taken by the plaintiffs in this
case. Going along in the annotation, Page 395, the Court's
attention is called to the case of Hamilton Mach. & Tool Co.
vs. Mechanic's Mach. Co., 179 Ill. App. 145, in which the
result is reached as contended for by the respondent in this
action.
The other Utah case cited in the appellant's brief is the
case of Jones vs. the Commercial Investment Trust, 228 Pacifiic
896. It is contended by the respondent that this case is not
in point. This is a case of the so-called floor planning of automobiles. The automobile company, namely Naylor-Woodruff
Motor Company, was purchasing automobiles for the factory
and the same were financed and floor planned by the Commercial Investment Trust. The automobile dealer received a
bill of sale for each automobile, and on receipt of the same,
he paid 20% of the purchase price plus freight. The title
to the automobile was transferred to the :finance company
under an instrument called a Negotiable Trust Receipt, and
this instrument provided that the dealer should display and
sell the automobiles and that on their sale he was then to
transmit the purchase price to the :finance company and receive
the title. The automobiles received in that case were received
by the dealer by October of 1922 and the dealer had until
December 1, 1922 in which to pay for the car in question. The
same was sold to an innocent purchaser. The dealer went
broke and failed to transmit the purchase price to the finance
company. The Court held that the buyer was entitled to the
car for the reason that the car was left with the dealer for
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the specific purpose of selling the same and the finance company was estopped to claim title to the car as against the innlocent purchaser. It is submitted that there are no such facts
present in the case before the Court. The RaDon Auto Sales
Company was not given authority to sell this automobile, it
had no bill of sale or any document of any kind which would
mislead any innocent purchaser. It was not being financed by
the plaintiffs in this action. There was no floor plan arrangement and under the facts of the Stipulation, there is nothing
to indicate that the plaintiffs intended the RaDon Auto Sales
Company to offer to display this car for sale until the draft had
been picked up and title delivered to the RaDon Auto Sales
Company. The RaDon Auto Sales had bare naked possession
only, which the annotations above referred to say is not sufficient.
The general proposition of law as cited from American
Jurisprudence, Blashfield and Williston, supra, cite cases involving watches, hogs, furniture and innumerable articles of
personal property and in all of these cases the so-called purchaser has no means of determining the title to the property
which they are acquiring. In the instant case, we have the
title statutes of the State of Utah to protect all parties and
as it is pointed out in the case of Dehl vs. Thomas, supra,
the Appellant should have been charged with some responsibility in determining whether Bruce had a right to sell the
automobile in question. The means was available to him and
certainly he could and should not stand in any stronger position than the purchaser of one of the innumerable articles
of personal property mentioned above.
27
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Out state in adopting the uniform statutes regarding conditional sales as pointed out above, provided that:
"Where goods are sold by a person who is not ~e
owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer
acquires no better title to the goods than the seller
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct
precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell."
Title 60, Chapter 2, Section 7, Utah Code Annotated,
1953."
and our Supreme Court has indicated that this and the registration statutes are not mere window dressing.
The Utah Court, in the case of Swartz vs. White, supra,
and the Court of our neighboring state, Idaho, in the case of
Lux vs. Lockridge, supra, hav~ held that these recording
statutes mean what they say and to follow the reasoning and
argument of the appellant in this brief and to follow the decisions of the cases cited by the appellant means in effect that
the registration statutes are wiped off the books, and statutes
like ours covering conditional sales above referred to will
have in effect been judicially repealed, in the case of automobiles.
It has become an eccepted fact that one who buys a piece
of real property without checking the title does so at his peril.
It is true that personal property is different than real property,
but in considering the registration statutes all of the safeguards have been set up to protect the public in acquiring automobiles, the same as in regard to real property. For this Court
to say that the fact that a person buys a car from a used car
dealer eliminates the necessity of checking the title of an
28
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automobile seems to do violence to the registration statutes.
In this respect it is conceded that in some of the reported cases
the Courts have in effect stated that the registration statutes
have not been enacted for this purpose, but it is the position
of the respondents in this action that the vendor and vendee
of an automobile have a right to rely upon the registration
statutes of the state and in this case the Denver Auto Auction
when they attached the title to the draft with the understanding with Bruce that the automobiles would not be placed
upon his lot until these drafts had been honored and the
titles picked up that they, the Denver Auto Auction, had a
right to assume that these certificates of title meant something
more than a mere scrap of paper and that they were entitled
to the protection that the registration statutes said they had
in retaining the certificates of title.

Point II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD
THAT IN COLORADO A RESERVATION OF TITLE IN
A SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IS REGARDED AS
A CHATTEL MORTGAGE, AND IS REQUIRED TO BE
FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE
STATUTE, AND THERE BEING NO COMPLIANCE
WITH THE COLORADO STATUTE ON THIS MATTER
THE RESERVATION OF TITLE IN THE RESPONDENT
IS INVALID.
The Appellant for the first time in this case raises the
question of the Colorado Statute or law. It was never pleaded
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and never raised in the lower Court. We submit, therefore, that
even assuming the law to be as stated by the appellant this
Court cannot consider this matter; and the Court's attention
is called to the 20 American Jurisprudence, Page 69, Sections
46 and 47, and to the Utah case of Dickson vs. Mullings,
66 Utah 282, 241 Pacific Reporter, 840 at Page 842, the Court
holds:
"Whether the state of New York has a statute on
the subject is not shown. No such or any statute of
New York is either pleaded or proved. It, of course, is
well settled that state courts cannot take judicial notice
of laws or statutes of a sister state. It also is well
settled in this jurisdiction (American Oak Leather Co.
v. Union Bank, 9 Utah, 87, 33 P. 246; Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah, 186, 72 P. 936; Stanford v. Gray, 42
Utah, 228, 129 P. 423, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 989; Grow
v. Railroad Co., 44 Utah 160, 138 P. 398, Ann. Cas.
1915B, 481) that, in the absence of proof, it will be
presumed that the law of another state is the same as
the law of the forum and the court will administer
and apply the law of the jurisdiction until the law of
the situs is shown. Thus, in the absence of proof, it
will be presumed that the law of New York on the
subject is the same as the law of Utah."

CONCLUSION
It is submitted, therefore, that Bruce, the used car dealer,
had only naked possession of the automobile in question. He
was given possession subject to the payment of a draft and
never receiving title to the automobile, there never was a sale
by the plaintiff, in this action, to Bruce. The transaction was
never completed. The title of the automobile was attached
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to the draft, sent to the bank of Bruce's designation and Bruce
did not honor the draft and acquire the title. Bruce did not
have anything to indicate he was the owner of this automobile
other than possession. No registration certificate or bill of
sale, nothing that would mislead the appellant in this action
to believe that he, Bruce, owned the automobile and had the
right to sell it. The appellant made no inquiries as he should
have done as has been pointed out in the cases cited in this
brief to Bruce's right to sell this automobile; and under the
cases cited by the Respondent he could not have been and
is not a bona fide purchaser for value of the automobile in
question. It is submitted, therefore, that the judgment of
the lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LOWRY, KIRTON & BETTILYON
Attorneys for Respondents
910 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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